Environmental Values
Environmental Values 17(2008): 5-14. doi: 10.3197/096327108X271914
ABSTRACT
Katie McShane, while accepting my 'convergence hypothesis' (the view that anthropocentrists and nonanthropocentrists will tend to propose similar policies), argues that nonanthropocentrism is nevertheless superior because it allows conservationists to have a deeper emotional commitment to natural objects than can anthropocentrists. I question this reasoning on two bases. First, McShane assumes a philosophically tendentious distinction between intrinsic and instrumental value - a distinction that presupposes a dualistic worldview. Second, I question why McShane believes anthropocentrists - weak anthropocentrists, that is - cannot 'love' or 'feel awe' toward natural objects. Her argument, that is, only works against strong anthropocentrism, which I never advocated.
KEYWORDS
Anthropocentrism, emotions, convergence
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