Environmental Values
Environmental Values 19 (2010): 517-535. doi: 10.3197/096327110X531589
ABSTRACT
Ever since environmental ethics (EE) began to take form as an academic discipline in the early 1970s, the notion of intrinsic value has occupied a prominent position within the field. Recently, however, various types of critique have emerged within EE against invoking this notion. Contrary to these critiques, I argue that appeals to intrinsic value are not problematic, given the reason-implying sense of 'intrinsic value' that is most relevant to EE. I further argue that also those who criticise 'intrinsic-value-talk' in EE actually need this reason-implying concept of intrinsic value. However, once we realise that this is the sense of 'intrinsic value' that is most relevant to EE, it also becomes clear that it is the concept of a reason, rather than that of intrinsic value, that is most important to EE.
KEYWORDS
Reasons, intrinsic value, anthropocentrism, moral standing, environmental ethics
REFERENCES to other articles in Environmental Values:
Postmodernism, Value and Objectivity Robin Attfield
The Pragmatic Power and Promise of Theoretical Environmental Ethics: Forging a New Discourse J. Baird Callicott
Animal Liberation is an Environmental Ethic. Dale Jamieson
Animal Liberation is not an Environmental Ethic: A Response to Dale Jamieson. Roger Crisp
Two Distinctions in Environmental Goodness. Karen Green
Convergence, Noninstrumental Value and the Semantics of 'Love': Comment on McShane. Bryan G. Norton
CITATIONS in other Environmental Values articles
Editorial: Lessons Learned. Katie McShane
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