Environmental Values
Environmental Values 7(1998): 397-421. doi: 10.3197/096327198129341645
Recognition of intentionality and the possibility of agency in nonhuman others is a prerequisite for a process of mutual adjustment and dialogue that could replace current reductive and dualistic human-centred theories. John Andrews' article in this issue of Environmental Values is criticised for misattributing to me the view that intentionality could be a sole criterion for moral worth - a view which I reject as unacceptably hierarchical and human-centred. To clarify my position, the values and limitations of different kinds of ranking are discussed; and the concept of intentionality is explored, with particular reference to apparently purposeful machines and to Dennett's theory of consciousness.
KEYWORDS: consciousness, dualism, moral extensionism, intentionality, panpsychism, ranking, reductionism
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